Close. What they were worried about was a hot war with the Soviets. There was also a great deal of uncertainty about Japanese willingness to continue to fight. It’s simply not the case that they had clear unambiguous intelligence on Japanese leadership’s intentions, which makes sense since there were several schools of thought among the Japanese.
Japan was not closer to conditionally surrendering to the USSR instead of the US. Even if they were that doesn’t magically make their war with the US end.
The reason for the bombs being dropped is very clear and you’re free to read countless books, articles, papers on it.
The Cold War started even before WWII ended.
Yes but not every choice during WW2 was about countering communism. We supplied them with an absolute ton of weapons and cutting edge vehicles, planes during the war. The threat of the axis/fascism far outweighed the threat of communism spreading at the time.
Weren’t the nukes also dropped because Japan’s highest-level commanders were dead-set on fighting more or less to the end, which would have caused horrific loss of life on both sides?
Also, I don’t remember reading this theory, but I would guess some of those commanders also felt like something ‘magical’ might happen to save the motherland, hearkening back to Kame Kaze’s taifuns that saved Nippon from Mongol invasion on two occasions, centuries earlier.
That is the standard argument we’re given, yes: that it would ultimately save lives compared to a conventional war. You can find dissenting views from Noam Chomsky & Michael Parenti & Howard Zinn & others, including the US government’s own analysis, if you care to.
There’s also the ‘Ask Historians’ analysis, which posits that there were at least three major ideas about how to handle a nuclear bombing entertained between the principles deciding.
While it’s tempting to look at the situation in retrospect and agree with the report that ‘yes obviously there wasn’t a need to bomb to elicit a surrender’ that nevertheless doesn’t mean that the majority of the deciders were fully on board with that understanding & approach, unlike Ike.
Without doing a deep dive, the AH approach makes about the most sense to me and seems consistent with history, in which there was a level of uncertainty and multiple players & arguments going in to the final decision.
Btw, that first link barely mentions the matter, and the second link is far too subjective to be of much use, far as I can tell.
What’s the reason then?
Two reasons, I think:
Close. What they were worried about was a hot war with the Soviets. There was also a great deal of uncertainty about Japanese willingness to continue to fight. It’s simply not the case that they had clear unambiguous intelligence on Japanese leadership’s intentions, which makes sense since there were several schools of thought among the Japanese.
Japan was not closer to conditionally surrendering to the USSR instead of the US. Even if they were that doesn’t magically make their war with the US end.
The reason for the bombs being dropped is very clear and you’re free to read countless books, articles, papers on it.
Yes but not every choice during WW2 was about countering communism. We supplied them with an absolute ton of weapons and cutting edge vehicles, planes during the war. The threat of the axis/fascism far outweighed the threat of communism spreading at the time.
I’ve read the same arguments & documents as every other red-blooded American, but unlike most I’ve also read the counterarguments.
Weren’t the nukes also dropped because Japan’s highest-level commanders were dead-set on fighting more or less to the end, which would have caused horrific loss of life on both sides?
Also, I don’t remember reading this theory, but I would guess some of those commanders also felt like something ‘magical’ might happen to save the motherland, hearkening back to Kame Kaze’s taifuns that saved Nippon from Mongol invasion on two occasions, centuries earlier.
@davel@lemmy.ml
That is the standard argument we’re given, yes: that it would ultimately save lives compared to a conventional war. You can find dissenting views from Noam Chomsky & Michael Parenti & Howard Zinn & others, including the US government’s own analysis, if you care to.
There’s also the ‘Ask Historians’ analysis, which posits that there were at least three major ideas about how to handle a nuclear bombing entertained between the principles deciding.
While it’s tempting to look at the situation in retrospect and agree with the report that ‘yes obviously there wasn’t a need to bomb to elicit a surrender’ that nevertheless doesn’t mean that the majority of the deciders were fully on board with that understanding & approach, unlike Ike.
Without doing a deep dive, the AH approach makes about the most sense to me and seems consistent with history, in which there was a level of uncertainty and multiple players & arguments going in to the final decision.
Btw, that first link barely mentions the matter, and the second link is far too subjective to be of much use, far as I can tell.